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MAGIC WORDS AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE
Adam N. Steinman
It has been seventy-five years-almost o the day-since the Supreme
Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 1 Erie now claims paternity
over a broader doctrine that mediates whether state law or federal law will
govern particular aspects of a federal court lawsuit. That doctrine has
evolved over time, but there remains a core of truth to the oft-stated rule of
thumb that federal courts should apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.2
Given Erie's mystical (and mythical3 ) qualities, the subject of magic
words seems particularly appropriate. In his thought-provoking article,
Sergio Campos argues that magic words can play a valuable information-
forcing role. Rather than struggle to characterize state laws as substantive
or procedural, federal courts should put the onus on states to declare
explicitly that a particular rule is justified on substantive grounds. Unless
the state "utter[s] the magic words," federal courts should apply their own
rule, free in the constructive knowledge that they are not displacing state
substantive law.
5
For Campos, this approach hinges on the view that a state's substantive
justification for adopting a particular law is important.6 On the pages of the
Supreme Court Reporter, this is a hotly contested premise-one whose
validity remains unresolved, at least as to the Rules Enabling Act's
(REA's) instruction that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 7 That issue was on full
display in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance8
Co., the Supreme Court's most recent foray into the Erie doctrine.
Shady Grove concerned a New York law providing that actions to
recover certain kinds of statutory penalties "may not be maintained as a
class action."9 Splitting five-to-four, the Court held that Federal Rule 23
trumped New York's § 901(b).10 Only the five Justices in the majority
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court decided Erie on April 25, 1938. Id.
2. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
3. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 704 05 (1974).
4. Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573,
1628 30 (2012).
5. Id. at 1628.
6. See, e.g., id. at 1596 (describing the "common sense view" of the Rules Enabling Act that
inquires whether the state procedure has a "substantive justification") (citing Ely, supra note 3, at
727 28).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Campos argues that the state's purpose is relevant both to the REA
and the test for making a "relatively unguided Erie" choice, where there is no conflict between state
law and federal positive law. See Campos, supra note 4, at 1629.
8. 559 U.S. 393, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
9. Id. at 1436, n.1.
10. Id. at 1436, 1443-44.
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considered the REA. 11 Although all five concluded that applying Rule 23
did not violate the REA, Justices Scalia nd Stevens split over whether the
state's purpose in adopting a particular rule was relevant to the REA
inquiry. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion carefully examined New
York's justification for adopting § 901(b). 12 For Justice Scalia, however,
New York's purpose was irrelevant;13 the sole question is whether the
Federal Rule "really regulates procedure." 14
To appreciate what this debate means as a practical matter, it is
important to consider how Shady Grove handled other aspects of the Erie
doctrine's framework-particularly the majority's threshold finding that
Rule 23 and § 90 1(b) were in conflict with one another. As to that portion
of the opinion, Justice Scalia wrote on behalf of all five Justices in the
majority. He found such a conflict because both Rule 23 and § 901(b)
governed whether a "class action may be maintained."' 15 But he
acknowledged that the conflict might have been avoided if § 901(b) had
instead been framed in terms of whether statutory penalties were available
remedies in a class action. 16
This distinction is impossible to justify on functional grounds. To
prevent certification of a class action seeking statutory penalties will
necessarily make statutory penalties unavailable remedies in any class
action. 17 Perhaps, then, this aspect of Shady Grove is about magic words.
By choosing procedural magic words (whether a class action may be
maintained), New York created an ultimately fatal conflict with Rule 23.
But had it chosen substantive magic words (whether statutory penalties
were available remedies in a class action), the conflict with Rule 23 could
have been avoided. This made all the difference in Shady Grove, because
all nine Justices would have followed § 901(b) under the test for making
unguided Erie choices. 18
11. Justice Ginsburg and the dissenters concluded that there was no conflict between Rule 23
and § 901(b), and therefore applied the more state-friendly framework for making a so-called
"relatively unguided Erie choice." See Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and
the Rules Enabling Act after Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1131, 1138 39, 1141-42
(2011) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)).
12. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448, 1458 59 (Stevens, J., concurring) (considering the
New York legislature's "intent," its "policy judgment," and what it "had in mind"); but cf id at
1457 58 (stating that "the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one" and ultimately
concluding that § 901 (b) did not "operate as a limitation on New York's statutory damages" despite
an expressed concern that awarding statutory penalties in a class action "would lead to annihilating
punishment of the defendant" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. Id. at 1445 (plurality opinion) (stating that the REA "leaves no room for special
exemptions based on the function or purpose of a particular state rule").
14. Id. at 1444 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 1438 (majority opinion).
16. Id. at 1439.
17. See Steinman, supra note 11, at 1156.
18. Id. at 1141-42, n.64.
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Thus, there is a fascinating irony in Justice Scalia' s position. He would
prevent a state from vindicating its substantive purpose at the back end of
the Erie doctrine (the REA's substantive rights provision). But his
reasoning on whether a Federal Rule conflicts with state law could allow a
state to effectuate its substantive purpose at the front end, simply by
framing its law in substantive terms (e.g., available remedies). All this
confirms that the relationship between magic words, state purpose, and the
Erie doctrine remains a crucial, unresolved question. That relationship-
and Campos's article-deserve close attention as Erie's next seventy-five
years gets underway.
